To protect themselves from attacks, networks need to enforce ingress filtering, i.e., block inbound packets sent from spoofed IP addresses. Despite the importance of filtering spoofed packets and understanding the prevalence of the phenomenon, the existing studies do not allow to infer the extent of ingress filtering at Internet-scale, providing results with only a limited coverage of the Internet networks: they can either measure networks that operate servers with faulty network-stack implementations, or require installation of the measurement software on volunteer networks, or assume specific properties, like traceroute loops, which are challenging to reproduce in practice. Improving coverage of the spoofing measurements is critical.
Introduction
Source IP address spoofing allows attackers to generate and send packets with a false source IP address impersonating other Internet hosts. Source IP spoofing is employed by the attackers, e.g., for avoiding detection and filtering of attack sources, for reflecting attack traffic, for DNS cache poisoning, for triggering services which can only be accessible to internal users. The best way to prevent IP spoofing is by enforcing Source Address Validation (SAV) on packets, a practice standardised in 2000 as BCP38 [13] : ingress filtering for blocking inbound packets with spoofed IP addresses and egress filtering for blocking outbound packets sent from spoofed IP addresses.
The idea underlying ingress filtering is that the source address of a packet should be checked against a set of permitted addresses before letting it into the network. Otherwise, the attackers using spoofed IP addresses belonging to the network can trigger and exploit internal services which are otherwise not accessible to external IP addresses, such as RPC. Enforcing ingress filtering is therefore critical for protecting the networks and the internal hosts against attacks.
Despite awareness to the risks and efforts to prevent IP spoofing, it is still a significant problem and attacks utilising IP spoofing remain widespread [6, 8, 14, 24, 26, 27] . There are significant research and operational efforts to understand the extent and the scope of (ingress and egress)-filtering enforcement and to characterise the networks which do not filter spoofed packets; we discuss these in Related Work, Section 2. Although the existing studies and tools, such as the Open Resolver Project [23] or the Spoofer Project [3-5, 18, 20] , provide a valuable contribution for inferring networks which do not enforce spoofing, they are nevertheless insufficient: they provide a meager (often non-uniform) coverage of the Internet networks and are limited in their applicability as well as effectiveness.
In this work we present the first Internet-scale scanner for ingress filtering, we call the Spoofing Mapper (SMap), and apply it for evaluation of filtering of spoofed packets in the Internet. SMap is a network scanner specifically designed for performing comprehensive Internet-wide measurements of ingress filtering. In contrast to previous excellent studies of ingress filtering, which however are limited to a small set of networks, SMap enables scans of the entire Internet address space, measuring networks which do not filter inbound spoofed packets.
In this work we apply SMap for scanning ingress-filtering in networks operating more than 3M popular domains, hosted in more than 46% of the Autonomous Systems (ASes) in the Internet. The measurements with SMap found that more than 45% of the tested ASes do not enforce ingress filtering (i.e., 21% of all the ASes in the routing system), in contrast to 2.5% identified by the latest measurement of the Spoofer Project [20] .
Limitations of Filtering Studies
The measurement community provided indispensable studies for assessing "spoofability" in the Internet, and has had huge success in detecting the ability to spoof in some individual networks using active measurements, e.g., via agents installed on those networks [18, 23] , or by identifying spoofed packets using offline analysis of traffic, e.g., [19, 20] . These studies however provide a limited and non-uniform coverage of the Internet. Carrying out measurements of spoofability in the global Internet is challenging. The key concerns for conducting Internet measurements, upon which conclusions can be drawn, are scalable measurement infrastructure, good coverage of the Internet and a representative selection of measurement's vantage points. We next list the limitations of the existing studies:
Limited coverage. Previous studies infer spoofability information based on a limited set of networks. For instance, networks that operate servers with faulty network stack [16] or networks with volunteers that execute the measurement software [3-5, 18, 20, 23] , or networks that agree to cooperate and volunteer their traffic logs for offline analysis, e.g., [20] .
Non-representative Internet measurements. Volunteer or crowd-sourcing studies, such as the Spoofer Project [18] , are inherently limited due to bias introduced by the participants. These measurements are performed using a limited number of vantage points in specific networks, and hence are often not representative of the entire Internet. Increasing the coverage and selecting the networks more uniformly is imperative for collecting representative data - [15] showed that the measured network can significantly influence the resulting data as well as the derived conclusions.
Unstable measurement infrastructure. Current measurement studies use unstable infrastructures: volunteers running agents can reinstall computers or move to other networks; misconfigured servers (e.g., with open resolution or with faulty network stack) can be updated -all causing the network to "disappear from the radar" although it may still be spoofable. Hence, longitudinal studies, such as the Spoofer Project, are biased by the stability of the vantage points, and do not allow accurate tracking of deployment of ingress filtering in individual networks.
SMap: The Spoofing Mapper
SMap performs active black-box measurements of ingress filtering using standard protocols and protocols' behaviour in the tested networks. SMap does not require any coordination with the tested networks, nor installation of any software. SMap receives a list of networks, and performs ingress filtering scans by exchanging packets with the tested networks and inferring spoofability based on the packets arriving from the tested networks. SMap does not require vantage points in the tested networks nor misconfigured servers, SMap infrastructure can be setup in one location, see components in Figure 5 . In this work we developed scan techniques based on three protocols: DNS, PMTUD and IPID, which can run over TCP, UDP and ICMP, and applied them for Internet-scale measurements of ingress filtering. These protocols are widely supported by the TCP/IP networks in the Internet. Furthermore, the modular architecture of SMap allows easy integration of new protocols and techniques in the future.
Using standard protocols' behaviour provides better stability of the test infrastructure, since, in contrast to [18, 23] we do not risk volunteers moving to other networks or formatting their hosts, nor misconfigured servers being patched. The servers that we use in our measurements can be moved to different IP addresses, this however makes no difference for our data collected with SMap, since the new IP addresses of the servers can be retrieved with DNS requests or by scanning. Therefore, once we have a test server in a network we typically do not lose a measurement point in that network. Higher stability also allows for more accurate reproduction and validation of our datasets and results, and enables to perform reliable longitudinal studies. Ingress filtering measurements with SMap plotted in Figure 1 , since its inception between 10 July 2019 and 10 February 2020, demonstrate that the number of spoofable ASes is stable and proportionally increases with the growth in the number of ASes.
SMap enables running Internet-wide scans of ingress filtering by probing large portions of the address space (as well as the entire address space). Such scans have proven to be a valuable methodology for security research and operational communities. Internet-wide scans provide better understanding of deployment of best practices and of vulnerabilities. SMap breaks the current barrier of the existing tools, enabling scanning the entire Internet for ingress filtering.
Ethical Considerations
We devised a tool for Internet-wide scans of ingress filtering in remote networks. Internet-wide scans are important for security research [12, 21] and have proven valuable in improving the security landscape of the Internet, including exposing new vulnerabilities, tracking adoption of defences. Nevertheless, Internet-wide scans introduce also ethical challenges. We communicated with network operators to understand and consider the ethical implications of Internet-wide scans. We identified two issues as particularly important for our measurements: traffic load and consent.
Traffic load. Network scans, such as [12, 16, 21] , require exchanging packets with a large number of Internet networks as well as IP addresses inside the networks. We develop a series of measures in design of SMap to reduce the traffic load of our scans on the Internet and on the measured networks. In addition to supporting the mere scan of the IPv4 address range, we also integrated support for domain-based scans -this allows testing networks for ingress filtering without scanning them, hence remarkably reducing the traffic volume. We explain this in Section 4. We further integrated large inter-scan delays to reduce the load by spreading the measurements traffic over longer time periods.
Consent of the scanned. It is often impossible to request permission from owners of all the tested networks in advance, this challenge similarly applies to other Internet-wide studies [11, 12, 16, 21] . Like the other studies, [11, 12] , we provide an option to opt out of our scans. To opt out the network has to provide either its network block (in CIDR notation), domain or ASN through the contact page at http://to_be_revealed/. Performing security scans is important -the networks that do not enforce filtering of spoofed packets pose a hazard not only to their operators but also to their users, customers and services, as well as other networks. Due to the importance of identifying such networks, in their recent study [20] even make public the ("nameand-shame") lists of providers with missing or misconfigured filtering of spoofed packets; [20] also discuss stronger measures against spoofable networks, including liability for damages, and various types of regulation. Inevitably, due to the risks that such networks pose to the Internet ecosystem, it is of public interest to know who those networks are. We do not make the identity of the networks, that do not filter spoofed packets, publicly available, but inform the general public on the fraction of such networks and provide their characterisation (i.e., size, geo-location, business type) in Section 6.
Undoubtedly, filtering spoofed packets is critical and networks have to deploy best practices, such as BCP38 [13] and BCP84 [1] , to ensure security of the Internet ecosystem. Understanding the extent of filtering is also significant for devising future policies, defence mechanisms or estimating threats and risks to attacks.
Contributions
We propose a new approach for measuring ingress filtering in the Internet, and developed methodologies which do not require setting up vantage points, nor using misconfigured servers. We built an Internet-wide scanner, SMap, based on these methodologies and experimentally validated its effectiveness over a period of half a year by scanning networks hosting services from more than 3M popular domains. These networks constitute more than 46% of Internet's ASes. We report on the results of our measurements and compare them to the datasets published by other projects. We show that SMap provides not only much better coverage of the Internet (even when performing domains-based scans) but also a higher accuracy in identifying networks which do not filter spoofed packets. Indeed, applying SMap to the same ASes as projects [3, 19] (the only ones which make their datasets available), we found 13173 new ASes that do not enforce ingress filtering.
Similarly to other studies, SMap can also have false negatives (i.e., networks which do not enforce ingress filtering but are not identified by SMap), but does not have false positives. We discuss causes for false negatives and explain how to reduce them by increasing the traffic volumes of the scans. In this work we make the first step towards applying new approach for measuring ingress filtering and perform validation of its effectiveness. We leave it for future work to evaluate the tradeoffs between the traffic volume vs the accuracy of the scans.
SMap can be used by researchers for obtaining information on deployment of ingress filtering or as a service, e.g., by ISPs or NSPs, to provide periodic information on ingress filtering to their customers. Notifying networks about this periodically would reduce the fraction of networks which do not enforce ingress filtering.
We provide access to SMap, as well as to the datasets collected by SMap and the statistics, at http://to_be_revealed/. The website enables continuous and periodic collection and analysis of the ingress filtering, performs analyses and provides the results in form of plots and statistics.
Organisation
Our work is organised as follows: we compare our study and SMap to related work in Section 2. In Section 3 we describe our approach and the measurement methodology that we developed. In Section 4 we present the design and the implementation of SMap and the measurement techniques that it uses. In Section 5 we report on the data collected with SMap and the statistics that we derived from it. We characterise the networks which we found not to enforce ingress filtering in Section 6. We conclude this work in Section 7.
Related Work
Studies on deployment of filtering spoofed packets in the Internet can be grossly categorised as: using network traces or using vantage points. Vantage points can be based on volunteers or on faulty or misconfigured servers. Network traces can be collected actively, e.g., with traceroutes, or by passively recording the traffic, e.g., at IXP. We summarise the results of the previous studies in Table 1 , and briefly explain them next. Some of the studies below measure ingress filtering, the others egress filtering. We compare to both types of studies since they all are important for ensuring security and stability of the Internet infrastructure and there are large efforts to mitigate both problems.
Vantage Points (VP). Measurement of networks which do not perform egress filtering of packets with spoofed IP addresses was first presented by the Spoofer Project in 2005 [3] . The idea behind the Spoofer Project is to craft packets with spoofed IP addresses and check receipt thereof on the vantage points operated by the volunteers, i.e., participants who run a "spoofer" software provided by the authors. The code uses raw sockets to generate UDP packets with spoofed source IP addresses sent to the hosts operated by the volunteers. The spoofability is established by measuring the fraction of arriving packets from the clients to the measurement servers. Based on the data collected by the Spoofer Project many reports were published providing statistics on the deployment of egress filtering in the Internet [4, 5, 18, 20] ; we list the statistics in Table 1 . The downside of this approach is that the Spoofer Project requires users to download, compile and execute a softwarewhich also needs administrative privileges to run -once per measurement. This involves not only technically knowledgeable volunteers that agree to run untrusted code, but also networks which agree to operate such vantage points on their premises. The failures of the Spoofer Project are mostly related to failures to open raw sockets and send spoofed packets on some clients. Although providing an optimal setup for spoofing measurements, the vantage points provide a limited coverage of the Internet. Furthermore, [15] argue that operators are unlikely to volunteer or conduct measurements that could leak a negative security posture of their networks, including lack of support of BCP38 [13] . Hence, [15] propose that the most viable method to measure filtering of spoofed packets in more networks is by crowd-sourcing. In 2018 [18] performed a one-time study of the Spoofer Project by renting a 2000 EUR crowd-sourcing platforms with workers that executed the Spoofer software over a 6 weeks period. Their measurements included additional 342 ASes which were not covered by the Spoofer Project. Crowd-sourcing studies, in addition to being expensive, are also limited by the networks in which workers are present and do not provide longitudinal and repetitive studies that can be validated and reproduced.
In a recent longitudinal data analysis by the Spoofer Project [20] the authors observed that despite increase in the coverage of ASes that do not perform ingress filtering in the Internet, the test coverage across networks and geo-locations was non-uniform.
Closely related to volunteers is the vantage points measurements with faulty or misconfigured servers. [23] noticed that some DNS resolvers do not change the source IP addresses of the DNS requests that they forward to upstream resolvers and return the DNS responses using the IP addresses of the upstream resolvers -a problem which the authors trace to broken networking implementations. [16] used this observation to measure egress filtering in networks that operate such misconfigured DNS resolvers. The idea is that the DNS resolver receives a request, performs the resolution and sends a response but without changing the IP address of the response packet to its own address. Since the response is sent from IP address which does not belong to the AS on which the DNS server is located the authors conclude that the network does not perform egress filtering. Such measurements are limited only to networks which operate DNS servers with broken networking implementations: out of 225,888 networks that [16] measured, they could find such DNS servers only in 870 networks.
Since the Open Resolver and the Spoofer Projects are the only two infrastructures providing vantage points for measuring spoofing -their importance is immense as they facilitated many research works analysing the spoofability of networks based on the datasets collected by these infrastructures. Nevertheless, the studies using these infrastructure, e.g., [15, 20] , point out the problems with the representativeness of the collected data of the larger Internet. Both projects (the Spoofer and the Open Resolver) acknowledged the need to increase the coverage of the measurements, as well as the challenges for obtaining better coverage and stable vantage points.
Network Traces (NT). To overcome the dependency on vantage points for running the tests, researchers explored alternatives for inferring filtering of spoofed packets. A recent work used loops in traceroute to infer ability to send packets from spoofed IP addresses, [19] . The idea is that if the traceroute leaves the stub AS with the IP address of the vantage point initiating the traceroute and reaches the upstream provider then the provider does not perform ingress filtering. If the upstream provider's border router performs filtering, it should block the traceroute packet when it arrives from the stub AS, as the packet has a source address not belonging to the stub AS. This method detects lack of ingress filtering only on provider ASes (i.e., spoofable customer ASes cannot be detected). The study in [19] identified loops in 1780 ASes, which is 3.2% of all the ASes, and 703 of the ASes were found spoofable. Although a valuable complementary technique for active probes with vantage points, this approach has significant limitations: in the absence of loops ingress filtering cannot be inferred, alternately a forwarding loop in traceroute does not imply absence of filtering at the edge, since a loop resulting from a transient misconfiguration or routing update can occur anywhere in the network. Therefore, to identify a lack of ingress filtering reliably one needs to detect a border router and, more importantly, the traceroute loops need to be reproduced -a difficult problem in practice. Furthermore, reproducing or validating the dataset after some time is virtually impossible as the odds for failures rapidly increase. Running traceroutes is also challenging: black-holes in traceroutes, whereby the routers do not respond to probes or when routers have a limit for ICMP responses, are common in Internet [22] .
[17] developed a methodology to passively detect spoofed packets in traces recorded at a European IXP connecting 700 networks. The limitation of this approach is that it requires cooperation of the IXP to perform the analysis over the traffic and applies only to networks connected to the IXP. Allowing to identify spoofing that defacto took place, the approach proposed in [17] does not allow to run a targeted evaluation whether some network in question filters spoofed traffic. Specifically, this approach allows to identify networks that received packets with spoofed IP addresses during the time period during which the analysis was made. However, it misses out on the networks which do not enforce filtering but which did not receive packets from spoofed IP addresses (at least during the time frame in which the traces were collected).
A range of studies analysed network traces for ingress filtering using IP address characteristics [2, [7] [8] [9] 25] , or by inspecting on-path network equipment reaction to unwanted traffic, [30] .
SMap. In contrast to previous studies, SMap enables remote scan of entire Internet, improving the coverage and representativeness of the results. The studies of SMap can be reproduced and validated by anyone, without requiring taking over control of the vantage points. SMap, similarly to the Spoofer Project, allows repeating the measurements periodically, and performing longitudinal studies. However, in contrast to SMap, the datasets of the Spoofer Project cannot be reproduced, unless the Spoofer Project hands over the control over the software on the vantage points. Similarly to SMap, the Open Resolver project allows anyone to reproduce the measurement study but additionally needs to provide the list of misconfigured or faulty servers for running the study. See comparison in Table 1 .
Finally, SMap uses a much more stable measurement infrastructure that the previous studies: if a server in the tested network is moved to a different IP address, we can re-locate it either performing a DNS lookup with the domain name or via an IP range scan. Indeed, less than 1% of the networks during the half a year measurement period because not available for measurements. The Open Resolver and the Spoofer Projects [3, 23] can lose control over volunteers or vantage points once these are patched, reinstalled or moved to a different network.
Measurement Methodology
The measurement methodology underlying SMap uses active probes, some sent from spoofed and some sent from real source IP addresses, to popular services on the tested networks. The spoofed source IP addresses belong to the tested networks (this is similar to the Spoofer Project). The idea behind our methodology is that if the packets with spoofed addresses reach the services in tested networks, they trigger a certain action, which we can measure remotely. We monitor the packets arriving from the tested networks to our infrastructure to infer whether the tested networks enforce ingress filtering. If the action was not triggered, we conclude that spoofed packets did not reach the service. We develop three techniques to detect if networks filter spoofed traf-fic based on our methodology: DNS lookup, IPID and PMTUD based. To ensure that our measurements apply to as many Internet networks as possible, we devise measurement techniques using popular and widely used services: DNS resolvers, Name servers, Email servers and Web servers. The techniques leverage standard protocols' behaviour and perform indirect measurements of ingress filtering. The idea behind the IPID technique is to identify whether spoofed packets increment the IPID counter on a remote server on the tested network. The idea behind the DNS lookup is to cause the tested network to issue a DNS request to our Name servers. The idea behind the PMTUD technique is to cause the server on the tested network to reduce the MTU to a server on our network. The measurement infrastructure of SMap with the servers that we use is illustrated in Figure 5 .
In this section we present the methodology for using the popular services to measure ingress filtering in networks and explain how we find the services with the properties needed for our measurements.
DNS Lookup
Background. DNS provides lookup services to networks. Upon receiving a DNS request, the resolver performs the lookup of the requested domain name and returns the response with the requested record. Idea. We send a DNS request to the tested network from a spoofed IP address belonging to the tested network. If the network does not enforce ingress filtering, the request will arrive at the DNS resolver on that network. A query from a spoofed source IP address will cause the response to be sent to the IP address from which the request was sent, i.e., the spoofed IP address. Since we do not control the spoofed IP address, we will not be able to observe this event and hence will not be able to infer if the DNS resolver received our request or if the request was filtered due to spoofing. To obtain insights into the traffic arriving at the resolver in the tested network we utilise the payload of the DNS request: the query contains the domain which we own, set up on Name servers that we control. Namely, eventhough the response from the DNS resolver will be returned to the spoofed IP address and will not be received by us, the DNS request will be issued to our Name servers, which is an indication that the DNS resolver on the tested network received our DNS request, sent from spoofed IP address. Identifying DNS resolvers. The main challenge here is to locate the DNS resolvers within a domain/network and to trigger a DNS request to our Name servers. We use Email service in the target networks (retrieved via the MX type request in the target domain) to find the DNS resolvers. We send an email to target domain's Email server from one of our unique subdomains with a non-existing recipient set in the destination. This causes the Email server on the tested network to generate a Delivery Status Notification (DSN) error message [RFC3464] to our Email server. To be able to send us the DSN, the Email server will request the resolver on the tested network, to provide it the MX and A/AAAA records of our Email exchanger. At the same time, it may also trigger anti-spam checking, which requests (SPF/TXT, PTR, DKIM, DMARC)-type records in domains under our control. By monitoring the DNS queries at our Name servers, we collect the IP addresses of the resolvers. Using this methodology we identified 49252 DNS resolvers in 7141 networks.
IPID
Background. Each IP packet contains an IP Identifier (IPID) field, which is used to identify duplicate packets and for fragmentation. The IPID field is 16 bits in IPv4, and for each packet the Operating System (OS) assigns a new IPID value. There are different IPID assignment algorithms which can be categorised as: random and predictable. Predictable category uses either a global counter or multiple counters per designation IP address, such that the counter is incremented in predictable quotes. Random category selects each IPID value at random from a pool of values. Idea. In our measurement of ingress filtering with IPID technique we use services that assign globally incremental IPID values. The idea is that globally incremental IPID [RFC6864] [28] values leak traffic volume arriving at the service and can be measured by any Internet host. [10] used a globally incremental IPID for exchanging covert communication between two hosts, by encoding bits in traffic volume. We follow a similar idea to design a technique for inferring ingress filtering. Given a server with a globally incremental IPID on the tested network, we sample the IPID value (send a packet to the server and receive a response) from the IP addresses controlled by us. We then generate a set of packets to the server from spoofed IP addresses, belonging to the tested network. Then we probe the IPID value again, by sending packets from our real IP address. If the spoofed packets reached the server, they incremented the IPID counter on the server -an event which we infer when probing the value from our real IP address the second time.
As we show in Section 4.2, the traffic rates to servers can be predicted. Hence the challenge here is to accurately probe the increments rate of the IPID value (caused by packets from other sources not controlled by us), in order to be able to extrapolate the value that will have been assigned to our second probe from a real source IP. This allows us to infer if the spoofed packets incremented the IPID counter.
Measuring IPID increment rate. The traffic to the servers is stable and hence can be predicted, [29] . We validate this by sampling the IPID value at the servers which we use for running the test. One example evaluation of IPID sampling on one of the busiest servers is plotted in Figure 2 . In this evaluation we issued queries to a Name server at 69.13.54.XXX during three minutes, and plot the IPID values received in responses in Figure  2 -the identical patterns demonstrate predictable increment rates. Which means that the traffic to the server arrives at a stable rate.
Identifying servers with global IPID counters. We send packets from two hosts (with different IP addresses) to a server on a tested network. We implemented probing over TCP SYN, ping and using requests/responses to Name servers and we apply the suitable test depending on the server that we identify on the tested network. If the responses contain globally incremental IPID values -we use the service for ingress filtering measurement with IPID technique. We located globally incremental IPID in 37% of the measured networks. There are certainly more hosts on networks that support globally incremental IPID values, yet our goal was to validate our measurement techniques while keeping the measurement traffic low -hence we avoided scanning the networks for additional hosts and only checked for Web, Email or Name servers with globally incremental IPID counters via queries to the tested domain.
Statistics of IPID values distribution among tested servers are plotted in Figure 3 . When ICMP is filtered, it results in ERROR, when run with TCP, the IPID values are often zero (i.e., ZERO IPID in graph) in Figure 3 . To improve coverage of the IPID technique we merge the ICMP&TCP and ICMP&UDP results for each server in our measurements.
PMTUD
Background. Path Maximum Transmission Unit Discovery (PMTUD) determines the MTU size on the network path between two IP hosts. The process starts by setting the Don't Fragment (DF) bit in IP headers. Any router along the path whose MTU is smaller than the packet will drop the packet, and send back an ICMP Fragmentation Needed / Packet Too Big (PTB). The payload of the ICMP packet contains the IP header and the first 8 bytes of the original packet that triggered the error as well as the MTU of the router that sent the ICMP message; see ICMP packet format in Figure 4 . After receiving an ICMP PTB message, the source host should either reduce its path MTU appropriately or unset the DF bit. Idea. The of the PMTUD technique is to conceal the source IP address of a prober on our infrastructure in the packet, and to send the ICMP fragmentation needed packet from a spoofed source IP address (belonging to a host on the tested network). Specifically, we probe the MTU to a service on the tested network, then send ICMP PTB from a spoofed IP address. If the packet arrives at Figure 4 : ICMP fragmentation needed packet from prober at 7.7.7.7 to server at 1.2.3.7 indicating an MTU of 100 bytes with spoofed source IP the service, it will reduce the MTU to our prober, and we will identify this event in the next packet from the service -this event implies that the tested network does not apply ingress filtering.
SMap
SMap architecture consists of two parts: dataset scan and ingress filtering scan; see Figure 5 . The dataset scan collects the popular servers (DNS resolvers and Name/Email/Web servers) in the tested networks. The ingress filtering scan is applied against the servers collected by the dataset scan. In this section we show the implementation of the measurement techniques that we developed for measuring ingress filtering (based on IPID, DNS, and PMTUD) and integrated into SMap. 
Dataset Scan
We present two approaches for scanning for servers that we implemented into SMap and discuss the differences between them. We also show the output returned by the dataset scan.
Output. The task of the dataset scan is given a list of networks, to produce and output a dataset that contains the servers against which SMap will run periodic ingress filtering measurements. The output list contains the following columns (for illustration we also list two example rows) for every server in every network: Collecting the servers. The output list can be created by scanning the IPv4 range. Although this provides an optimal coverage of the Internet it also creates a huge load of traffic on the Internet as well as on the networks which need to be scanned to locate the servers. Specifically, to locate the services SMap needs to send probes to every IP, checking for open ports that correspond to the services that we need; for instance, port 25 for Email, 53 for DNS, 80/443 for Web. Scans of IPv4 range are often performed, e.g., for measuring vulnerabilities or adoption of defences [11, 12] , and for measuring filtering of spoofed packets, e.g., [16, 23] . To reduce the traffic load, we develop a domains-scan. In contrast to IPv4 scan, domains-scan does not require scanning each IP address on a network: identification of the needed servers can be done by querying the DNS. Specifically, for every domain, we query the IP and hostname of the services that we need: (A, MX) for Email server, A for Web server, (A, NS) for name server.
We implemented IPv4 range scan and domains-scan into SMap. The algorithms, describing the steps needed for collecting the servers according to domains-scan and IPv4 scan are illustrated in Appendix, in Algorithms 1 and 2 respectively. Domainwide scan is performed from two cloud Virtual Private Servers (VPS), both similarly configured: 1 dedicated physical CPU thread, 512MB RAM and network connection at 20Mbit/Sec. A single measurement can be completed in less than a day, however, in order to reduce the traffic load on the tested networks we spread our measurement over a week.
Architecture. The dataset scan consists of the following components: orchestrator, DNS resolver, EMail, and two name servers: one authoritative for the test domain, the other for the domain in reverse DNS tree; see Figure 5 . The central component is the orchestrator. It receives in an input a list of domains or a list of networks in CIDR notation (e.g., entire IPv4 range), uses the resolver to perform lookups of the (Web, Email, Name) servers in the tested networks, and uses the Email server to locate DNS resolvers in the tested networks and returns in an output the list of services according to ASes, IPs, domains and network blocks.
For instance, according to domains-scan, given a domain example.net, the orchestrator asks the DNS resolver to lookup A, MX of example.net for Email server, A, NS records of example.net for Name server and A for www.example.net. Then, it sends an Email to the MX server of example.net, and monitors (using TCPdump) for SPF/TXT/PTR records arriving from the tested network to Name servers on our SMap infrastructure (Name servers authoritative for our test domain and for the reverse DNS domain of our IP address block); see Section 3 for explanation. The orchestrator then collects the TCPdump from the Name servers.
The orchestrator also uses an opt-out list to remove networks from the scan that do not wish to be tested. The orchestrator compiles a complete list of services, with the output described above and provides it to the prober host(s) for running the ingress filtering measurements.
Ingress Filtering Scan
SMap consists of a measurement client (the web interface), which controls two backend measurement prober hosts. The prober hosts receive the dataset to be scanned from the orchestrator and run IPID, PMTUD and DNS lookup tests against the servers on the dataset list. Similarly to the Spoofer Project, [3] , in each network the spoofed packets are selected as the next neighbour of the server. For instance, given a server at IP address 1.2.3.4 we select the next neighbour as 1.2.3.4/31, namely 1.2.3.5, which is the IP address that we will be spoofing in the tests involving the server at In our measurements in Section 5 we performed all three tests for each AS, in order to compare the success and applicability of each technique. In actual measurements for ingress filtering, to improve performance, one successful test suffices. The results from the tests are stored in the backend database and runs analyses over it. The GUI displays the results of the measurements that were performed and allows scanning new networks for ingress filtering; see http://to_be_revealed/. We next present each technique.
IPID. We build a measurement technique using an IPID side channel. The idea is to use a server with a globally incremental IPID counter, and to check if packets from spoofed IP address to that server increment the counter. The components used by this tool are: the prober at IP address 7.7.7.7 and a server at IP address 1.2.3.7 that uses globally incremental IPID, illustrated in Figure 6 . Using the prober at 7.7.7.7, we measure the value of the IPID and the rate at which IPID increments. As we showed, the traffic volumes to the servers in the Internet is stable and hence can be predicted.
For this, we send N probes to 7.7.7.7 (in step (1) in Figure  6 ). Let the IPID value in the response to the first probe be X and in each subsequent response i (0 < i < N) the IPID value is X + i + f , where f is a function of the additional traffic that the server receives from other sources. If the IPID value in N th response is Y = X +N + f , then the server is using globally incremental IPID assignment. Repeating this process also allows us to estimate f . Once we establish the rate f at which the traffic is arriving and the current IPID value, we test if the network performs ingress filtering. Specifically, in step (3) in Figure 6 , we send a set of M packets from a spoofed source IP address 1.2.3.6 (belonging to the probed network). In step (4) we sample the IPID value from the server from the prober's real IP address 7.7.7.7this is needed in order to receive the response. We check the IPID value Z in step (5) in Figure 6 . If the counter incremented proportionally to the number of packets sent (Z = Y + M + f ) then there is no ingress filtering, since packets from a spoofed IP address belonging to the network increment the counter. As an example consider the following simplified algorithm for inferring the IPID rate and value with fixed number of probes (the generalised case is straightforward). We send probes to the server and record the corresponding time T and IPID values. As IPID is an unsigned 16-bit integer, we define ∆IPID i = (IPID i+1 − IPID i + 2 16 )%2 16 , i = 1, 2, 3, 4. After we have sent 4 requests to the server: 1st&3rd from prober1 and 2nd&4th from prober2, we will see if the Server is using globally sequential IPID, by checking ∆IPID i ≤ 1000, i = 1, 2, 3. If it has globally sequential IPID, we spoof 10 packets with server's neighbour IP 1 as source IP and send 5th request from prober1. We then use the following calculation to estimate the average IPID rate and check if it was incremented by our spoofed packets:
We define outcomes of a test with IPID technique as spoofable, applicable, non-applicable, N/A; see Table 2 . The IPID technique is not applicable if the IPID counter is constant zero or if the IPID counter is not globally incremental.
Path MTU Discovery (PMTUD). The core idea of the tool is to send the ICMP PTB message from a spoofed source IP address, belonging to the tested network, and in the 8 bytes payload of the ICMP to insert the real IP address belonging to the prober. If the network does not enforce ingress filtering, the server will receive the PMTUD message and will reduce the MTU to the IP address specified in the first 8 bytes of the ICMP payload.
We identified networks that support PMTUD (i.e., do not filter ICMP Fragmentation Needed (Type 3, Code 4) test is illustrated in Figure 7 . We establish a TCP connection to a server on the tested network. Then we send Request1 and receive Response1. If DF bit is not set, the server does not support PMTUD. Otherwise, we send an ICMP PTB with smaller MTU. Following that, we request again and get Response2. If DF 1 == 1 and (DF 2 == 0 or size 2 ≤ size 1 ), server supports PM-TUD. Now we can proceed to test if ingress filtering is enforced. We spoof an ICMP PTB with smallest MTU, using server's neighbour IP as source IP address. Once that is done, we make another request. The server is not protected by ingress filtering if following condition applies: size 3 ≤ size 2 or (DF 2 == 1 and DF 3 == 0)
We define outcomes of a test with PMTUD technique as spoofable, applicable, non-applicable, N/A; see rightmost column in Table 2 . DNS lookup. Given a DNS resolver at IP 1.2.3.7, we send a DNS query to 1.2.3.7 port 53 asking for a record in domain under our control. The query is sent from a spoofed source IP address belonging to the tested network. We monitor for DNS requests arriving at our Name server. If a query for the requested record arrives from 1.2.3.7, we mark the network as not enforcing ingress filtering. The process is illustrated in Figure 8 , steps (1-4) locate the IP address of the DNS resolver, and steps (5, 6) test for ingress filtering on that network.
Measurement Evaluations
In this section we report on domain-wide measurement of ingress filtering with SMap. Our dataset collection with SMap has been initiated on July 2019. Our latest measurement covers over 3M domains. We collect the most popular services according to top-1M Alexa domains, CISCO umbrella, and other popular services, merged together while removing duplicates. After the dataset scan, we found 310415 Name servers in 21192 ASes, 494079 Email servers in 21971 ASes, and 861927 Web servers in 20840 ASes; see Table 4 . The the data of the ingress filtering measurements with SMap is summarised in Table 3 .
Our measurements covered more than 3M domains, whose services were hosted in 30563 ASes; see Table 3 . The techniques that we integrated into SMap (IPID, PMTUD, DNS lookup) were found applicable to more than 82% of the measured ASes. Using SMap we identified 47.56% of the ASes that do not enforce ingress filtering. For comparison, in Appendix, Table 6 we provide data analysis according to domains (instead of ASes as in Table 3 ). Not surprisingly the applicability of our techniques is much higher, i.e., more than 90%, since domains have at least one publicly available service, typically name server.
In what follows we compare the effectiveness of the techniques, explain causes for false negatives and failures.
Applicability and Success
As can be seen in Table 3 the most applicable technique is DNS lookup, which applied to 72% of the ASes we measured, yet tests with DNS lookup identified only 30% of the ASes as spoofable.
In contrast, a test against Web servers with PMTUD technique, which applied to a bit more than 50% of the ASes, yielded the highest fraction of spoofable ASes. This is not surprising, since it is expected that firewalls would block port 53 from the Internet to the IP address of the resolver, making the test appear as "not successful" even if the firewalls do not actually defacto apply ingress filtering, while it is recommended not to block ICMP to Web servers to allow for path MTU discovery. In Appendix, Table 6 we list measurement results according to domains -also here the most applicable test is via DNS lookup technique and PMTUD technique against Web servers yielded the highest number of spoofable networks. In Appendix, Figures 14 and 15 we plot the correlation between ASes and domains -essentially the graphs show that domains are typically hosted on more than one AS and ASes host multiple domains. We next compare the success and applicability of tests with PMTUD and IPID techniques against Email, Name and Web servers. In order to compare the effectiveness of the PMTUD and IPID measurement techniques as well as their applicability, we define the spoofable and testable rates, as follows:
The spoofable rate reflects the fraction of networks found not to apply ingress filtering and the testable rate means applicability of the test technique.
In Figure 9 we plot the coverage of each of the three techniques for different types of servers (Web, Name, and Email). Figure 9 shows that DNS-lookup technique (listed as "DNS" in Figure 9 ) has a better test rate than either of the IPID and PM-TUD tests. Between the other two, PMTUD test has a much higher applicability (test rate) than IPID test, which indicates that PMTUD is more supported than globally sequential IPID.
Even though PMTUD test applies to more networks than IPID test, IPID test reports more networks as spoofable. Especially when we consider the hit rate N spoo f able N testable , IPID test has over 50%, which is much higher than the other two tests. An interesting finding is that over half of the networks which have a Name server with globally sequential IPID counter are vulnerable to IP spoofing.
In general, tests against Name servers have a higher applicability rate than the tests with Email or Web servers, regardless of which technique was used (IPID or PMTUD). The reason is twofold: first, every domain has at least one Name server while it is not guaranteed that each domain has a Web or an Email server. Second, DNS is a fundamental protocol that any user and service on the Internet needs, in order to locate other services. Indeed, almost all the networks where tests against Name servers were applicable, but against Email or Web not, it was due to the fact that the network did not operate Email/Web servers. To test this, we select a random sample of networks, among those in which the tests against Email and Web did not apply but against Name server applied; a scan shows that ports 80/443 and 25 on those networks are not open. Furthermore, we find that when a Name server is not available ("N/A"), both Email and Web servers cannot be tested, either. This also results in much higher N/A outcomes for tests against Email and Web servers as opposed to Name servers.
The higher applicability of the tests against Name servers also correlates with a higher number of spoofable networks. In Appendix, Figures 16 and 17 , we show the relationships between the applicability of SMap measurement techniques to different services and the overlap between them. 
Errors
We define the result of SMap evaluation successful (i.e., true positive) if at least one of the three tests outputs that the tested network does not filter spoofed packets: either the IPID value on the server in the tested network was incremented as expected (IPID test) or we receive a query at our domain (DNS test) or the server on the tested network reduced the MTU of the packets sent to us (PMTUD test). When either of the three techniques provides a positive result, we mark the network as not filtering.
SMap does not make mistakes when reporting a network as not filtering. However, it can have false negatives: when the scan does not report network as not filtering when a network does not filter spoofed packets.
No False Positives
Our techniques are not susceptible to false positives, that is, classification of the tested network as filtering spoofed packets when in fact it does not do so. This is a side effect of our methodology -only when spoofing is not filtered will the "test action" be triggered.
IPID technique. When spoofing is not filtered the counter on the server will be incremented -which is the test action. At the probing phase the counter's value will equal or large than the expected value after the increment phase. The GPS encoding and repeated measurements ensure that we do not accidentally interpret noise (i.e., packets from other sources to the same server) as lack of ingress filtering.
DNS technique. When spoofing is not filtered the DNS resolver on the tested network will receive a DNS request from a spoofed IP address to our domain. Hence a query at our domain is the test action that spoofed packets are not filtered.
PMTUD technique. Reduction of the MTU of the packets sent from the test server to our network is the action which indicates that spoofing filtering is not enforced.
False Negatives
False negatives in our measurements mean that a network that does not perform filtering of spoofed packets is not marked as such. We next list the causes of false negatives for each of our three techniques. Essentially the false negatives cannot be resolved, and therefore our measurement results of networks that enforce ingress filtering introduce a a lower bound. The networks that we classify as those that do not apply ingress filtering -definitely allow packets from spoofed IP addresses into the network. The networks which were not classified as "not enforcing ingress filtering", could still be "not enforcing ingress filtering", but this cannot be determined using our techniques.
IPID technique. Load balancing can introduce a challenge in identifying whether a given network enforces ingress filtering. As a result of load balancing our packets will be split between multiple instances of the server, hence resulting in low IPID counter values. There are different approaches for distributing the load to different instances, e.g., random or round robin, which makes it impossible to identify whether a "load-balanced-server" is on a network which applies ingress filtering or not.
Anycasted server instances can also introduce a challenge in inferring ingress filtering enforcement. We identified such cases by performing traceroutes to the server.
DNS technique. Firewalls, blocking incoming packets on port 53, would as a result generate a similar effect as ingress filtering on our servers: we would not receive any DNS requests to our domain. However, such a setting does not indicate that the tested network actually performs ingress filtering.
PMTUD technique. Firewalls are often configured to block ICMP packets. In such case the evaluation result is similar as when a tested network does not enforce ingress filtering: our PMTUD packets will be blocked by the firewall, but not because they originate from an IP address that belongs to the tested network but because the firewall blocks ICMP packets. This case can be identified by sending ICMP PMTUD packets from an IP address that does not belong to the network. If the ICMP packets are not blocked (but were blocked when the packets were sent from a spoofed IP address) then the network does not block ICMP packets and does enforce IP spoofing filtering. On the other hand if the packets are blocked then one cannot determine if the blocking is done because of ICMP or because of filtering of spoofed IP addresses.
Improving Accuracy
The accuracy of the measurements with SMap can be improved by identifying more servers to which our techniques apply, this however requires generating more traffic. Specifically, in this work our goal is to evaluate the effectiveness of domains-scan by resolving the MX, NS and A records (that correspond to Email, Name and Web servers) and to run the tests against them, providing a lower bound on the effectiveness of our proposal, while keeping the traffic low. Nevertheless, in every AS there are typically multiple hosts which operate (Web, Email or Name) servers on ports 80/443, 25 and 53, in addition to the services that appear in the zonefile of the domain. To identify more servers, a scan of the AS for ports 53, 25 and 80/443 is required.
Comparison with Other Measurements
To understand the effectiveness of our methodologies we compare the results of our measurements with the active measurements of ingress filtering performed by the CAIDA Spoofer Project. These are two types of measurements: using traceroute and using agents. The spoofer project is the only measurement study that makes the datasets from their scans available online. The traceroute approach and the agents approach are the only two other active measurements of enforcement of ingress filtering (see Related Work Section 2). We crawled all the 217917 session reports in 2019 of CAIDA Spoofer Project. These included 2867 ASes with Spoofer Project agents, and 2500 ASes with Spoofer Project traceroute loops (total of 5367 ASes). Using our methodologies we measured 30563 ASes. We covered 469% more ASes than the traceroute and agents approaches together. We compare between our results and the other two methodologies below.
Traceroute Active Measurements
We analyse the datasets from the traceroute measurements performed by the CAIDA Spoofer Project within the last year 2019, [19] . The measurements identified 2,500 unique loops, of these 703 were provider ASes, and 1780 customer ASes. The dataset found 688 ASes that do not enforce ingress filtering. Out of 688 ASes found with traceroutes by the Spoofer Project, we could not test 116 ASes (none of our tests applied) and 77 ASes were not included in our tests (those ASes could not be located from domain names -due to our attempt to reduce traffic and not to scan IPv4 but to collect the services via domain names). The rest of the ASes agree with our measurement results.
Agents Active Measurements
Agents with active probes found 608 ASes that were found not to be enforcing ingress filtering using the agents approach of the Spoofer Project (these include duplicates with the traceroute loops measurements). Those contain some of the duplicates from traceroute measurements: together both approaches of the Spoofer Project found 1113 ASes to be spoofable. Out of those we could not test 110 ASes, the rest were also identified by our tests.
Although the agents provide the optimal setup for testing filtering, with control over the packets that can be crafted and sent from both sides, as we explain in Related Work Section 2, this approach is limited only to networks that deploy agents on their networks. In contrast, SMap provides better coverage since it is potentially applicable to every network that has one of the services that are required in our tests.
In total, our results identified 13780 ASes to be spoofable, which is more than 45% of the ASes that we tested. This also 13780 -1113 = 12667 ASes more than both the traceroute and the agents approaches found.
These findings show that SMap offers benefits over the existing methods, providing better coverage of the ASes in the Internet and not requiring agents or conditions for obtaining traceroute loops, hence improving visibility of networks not enforcing ingress filtering.
Networks Analysis
In order to understand if there are differences in enforcement of ingress filtering between different network types and different countries, we perform characterisation of the networks that we found to not be filtering spoofed packets. Specifically, we ask the following questions: Does business type of networks or geolocation of networks influence filtering of spoofed packets?
To derive the geo-location of ASes we used NetAcuity geoip database. The results are listed in Table 5 . The tested ASes are distributed across different countries, with most ASes being in large countries, like US and Russia. The ration of spoofable ASes ranges between 32% and 54%, with Russia leading with the fraction of spoofable networks, with 54%. We also want to understand the types of networks that we could test via domains-wide scans. To derive the business types we use the PeeringDB. We classify the ASes according to the following business types: content, enterprise, Network Service Provider (NSP), Cable/DSL/ISP, non-profit, educational/research, route server at Internet Exchange Point (IXP) 2 We plot the networks that do not enforce ingress filtering according to business types in Figure 11 . According to our study enterprise and non-profit networks enforce ingress filtering more than other networks. In contrast, NSPs contain the most networks that do not enforce ingress filtering.
There is a strong correlation between the AS size and the enforcement of spoofing, see Figure 12 . Essentially, the larger the AS, the higher the probability that our tools identify that it does not filter spoofed packets. The reason can be directly related to our methodologies and the design of our study: the larger the network the more services it hosts. This means that we have more possibilities to test if spoofing is possible: for instance, we can identify a higher fraction of servers with a globally incremental IPID counters, which are not "load balanced". In Figure 13 we plot the statistics of the tested networks according to their size and type. The results show a correlation between the size of the network and its type. For instance, most NSP networks are large, with CIDR/6. This is aligned with our finding that among NSP networks there was the highest number of spoofable networks. In Appendix, we plot the fraction of spoofable networks according to networks' sizes for each network type separately, i.e., for DSL/ISP in Figure 20 , for NSP in Figure 21 , for enterprises in Figure 22 , for content providers in Figure 23 , for research organisations in Figure 24 , for non-profit organisations in Figure  25 , and for route server networks in Figure 26 . 
Conclusions
We showed that coverage of Internet with ingress filtering measurements can be substantially improved to include many more ASes that were previously not possible to study. We designed the first Spoofing Mapper (SMap) scanner, which enables Internetscale studies of ingress filtering, and applied it on ASes hosting services in popular domains. Our study covered 46.5% of the Internet ASes, in contrast to best coverage so far of 7.9% ASes performed by the Spoofer Project. This coverage can be further improved by scanning the IPv4 range. In this work our goal was to explore: given the minimal fraction of traffic generated, what is the lower bound on coverage and accuracy that can be achieved. In DNS looup and PMTUD tests the traffic volume that we generate is similar to that of the Spoofer Project (which generates the least traffic in comparison to the other active measurements). The traffic that IPID technique requires is proportional to the traffic volume that the server in the tested network receives. Nevertheless, even with the minimal traffic volume that we produce, the effectiveness of SMap is higher than those of previous studies: a comparative analysis of our results with the datasets published by the other tools showed that we found new ASes which were not previously identified as not filtering spoofed traffic. SMap also uses a much more stable infrastructure than the other studies which enables running more accurate longitudinal studies: for instance, since July 2019 less than 1% of periodically tested ASes became N/A. SMap performs active measurements in a black-box manner and can study any TCP/IP network with standard and widely supported services. SMap currently supports three techniques for testing ingress filtering: DNS-based, IPID-based and PMTUDbased. Our experimental comparison of the effectiveness of the techniques demonstrated that DNS-based technique has a wider applicability rate on networks that operate DNS resolvers than the other two techniques, while the detection of the spoofability of networks is more accurate with PMTUD. We show that the measurements performed by SMap provide a lower bound on the networks that do not enforce ingress filtering. Improving the accuracy of SMap measurements can be done in two ways:
Increasing the traffic volume. To reduce or completely eliminate false negatives future research is needed to devise new techniques or extend our techniques to resolve the limitations imposed by, e.g., blocking of ICMP or load balancing.
Extending SMap with more techniques. The design of SMap is modular to allow for easy integration of new measurement techniques.
We provide online access to SMap at http://to_be_ revealed/, with publicly available datasets that we collect statistics about ingress filtering that we measured. 
